CATE AND PERSONALLY CONVOLUTED THAT POLITICAL SCENE.
WE HAVE AT TIMES -- OF COURSE, RARELY -- LET OUR LE-

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    MSGNO
C
    SIRES FOR THIS COUNTRY LEAD US TO UNDERESTIMATE THE
    INTENSE FACTIONALISM IN THE PARTIES AND THE CONSPIRA-
    TORIAL NATURE OF MANY MILITARY LEADERS.
                                              POLITICAL
C
    PREDICTION IS A RISKY BUSINESS HERE AS IT SEEMS TO
    BE IN MCST COUNTRIES.
                           NONETHELESS. THE BROADER SLEEP
    OF RECENT THAI HISTORY HAS MUCH CONSISTENCY. FROM
C
    THIS THERE SHOULD BE AN UNDERLYING SET OF BASIC AS-
    SUMPTIONS SHARED BY THE FIELD AND WASHINGTON AS DE-
    PARTURE POINTS FOR ASSESSING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
(
        PERSPECTIVES THAT STRIKE ME AS HAVING BEEN LOST
    OR DISTORTED IN SOME OF THE MORE RECENT WASHINGTOA
    COMMENTARY INCLUDE:
(
        FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, "INSTABILITY" AS AP-
    PLIED TO THAILAND WILL REFER PRIMARILY TO CHANGES
    WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT; CLASSIC CASES OF "MUSICAL
•
    CHAIRS AT THE TOP" OR "OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES," .CR
    SOME SUCH STERECTYPE. NOT SCCIAL REVOLUTION. THE
    POLITICAL SITUATION HERE SHOULD PROBABLY BE DESCRIBED
MORE OFTEN AS "STABLE," MEANING THE ESTABLISHMENT
    STANDS TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME. THIS SEEMS ESPECI-
    ALLY TRUE WHEN THERE IS COMPARISON TO THE MORE CATA-
€
    CLYSMIC CHANGE THAT IN SOME COUNTRIES OFFERS THE COLY
    SOLUTION TO SOCIETAL CONFLICT.
         THE RECENT COUP IS AT WORST A REMINDER THAT THAT-
€
    LAND HAS YET TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING A
     SOUND POLITICAL SYSTEM. TO ITS CRECIT AND AT SOME
    COST, THE COUNTRY HAS SUSTAINED A PLURALISTIC, OPEN
(
     AND GENERALLY FREE SOCIETY (WITH SOME LAPSES) THROUGH
     THE TURMOIL OF SEARCH FOR A STRONGER FRAMEWORK.
    IS NOT A POLICE STATE; IT DOES NOT (YET) HAVE SIGNI-
€.
     FICANT SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER;
     AND COUPS ARE MCRE LIKELY TO CONSTITUTE A PAUSE OF
     SETBACK THAN A SOMERSAULT IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL
€
     EVOLUTION TOWARD A MORE PERMANENT SYSTEM WITH BROADER
    PARTICIPATION.
         ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HERE ARE ALSO RELATIVE. IT MAY
€:
     BE FASHIONABLE TO SAY THAT PREM OR HIS GOVERNMENT
     ■CAN®T COPE•™ BUT THESE DAYS• WHO CAN BESIDES OIL
(
     SHEIKS? ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONTRIBUTED TO KRIANGSAK®S
     DOWNFALL AND MAY DO THE SAME EVENTUALLY TO PREM.
     THAILAND CERTAINLY HAS SHCRT-TERM ECONOMIC PROBLE?S.
     BUT THE POINT IS THAT THAILAND'S SITUATION IS ON THE
WHOLE NCT TOO BAD.
                        AT THE SAME TIME. NO FORMULA CR
     SET OF POLICIES WILL PLEASE EVERYBODY AND THE GOVERN-
MENT HERE MUST PAY A POLITICAL PRICE FOR THIS FACI.
     THAT DOES NOT MAKE THE COUNTRY UNIQUE OR SIGNIFICANTLY
     WEAKER THAN OTHERS. IT DOES ADD TO THE SHORT-TERM
     POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY. CLEARLY A MARKED ECONOMIC
C
     DETERIORATION COULD HAVE A PROFOUND POLITICAL IMPACT
     AS IT WOULD ELSEWHERE.
EXDIS
         WEAK LEADERSHIP IS DECRIED HERE, BUT WILL PROEABLY
     BE THE NORM FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. THIS DOES NOT
     NECESSARILY MEAN DISASTER, DESPITE SOME PREDICTIONS TO
C
                    WITH 48 MILLION PEOPLE, A GNP OF ALOUT
     THE CONTRARY.
     32 BILLION DOLS, AND A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, THAILAND
     IS PROBABLY TOO COMPLEX TO BE RUN AGAIN BY A STRONGMAN
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LIKE FIELD MARSHAL SARIT OF THE EARLY 60°S AND WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY TOO COMPLEX FOR CONTINUED MILITARY

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                             *23/04/81* *01:00*
    RULE.
           SHIFTING CLIQUE ALLIANCES MAY WELL CONTINUE TO
    PRODUCE COLLEGIAL LEADERSHIP WHICH FOLLOWS THE COURSE
    OF LEAST RESISTANCE AND RESULTS IN CONTINUING SHUFFLES
(
    AT THE TOP.
        THAILAND IS AT A PARTICULAR JUNCTURE IN ITS POLITI-
    CAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, STILL RECOVERING FROM THE
(
    JOLTS OF THE 1970'S. GIVEN THE CONTEXT, ITS GOVERNMENTS
    HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL IN BRIDGING INTO THE 80 45.
    EVEN THOUGH SOME THAT MAY NOT BE SURE THE NATION IS ON
(
    THE RIGHT POLITICAL TRACK. THEY HAVE MOVED A LONG WAY
    FORWARD FROM THE EARLIER PROBLEMS OF CHAOTIC GOVERNMENT
    AND THE REPRESSIVE THANIN REGIME. SEVERAL INSTRUCTIVE
Œ
    SUCCESSES SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED:
        KRIANGSAK FOR ALL HIS FAULTS HIT A STRONG AND COM-
    MENDABLE NOTE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECENCILI-
€
            THE PROBLEMS OF CLASSIC COMMUNIST INSURGENT AC-
    TIVITY HAVE BEEN AT LEAST TEMPORARILY DEFUSED AND. AL-
    THOUGH THERE ARE TENSIONS. THE "LEFT" DOES NOT HAVE A
€
    FOCUS FOR UNIFIED ACTION.
        THE PREM I GOVERNMENT WAS ONE OF THE MOST CONFETENT
    COLLECTION OF MINISTERS THAILAND HAS ASSEMBLED. I RE-
GRET ITS DEMISE. IT CARRIED FORWARDED NEEDED ECONOMIC
    RESTRUCTURING THAT, WHILE STILL SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENTS
    TO SATISFY POLITICAL PRESSURES, HAS GOOD CHANCES OF
€
    LAYING DOWN A BETTER FOUNDATION TO SUSTAIN THAI ENTRE-
    PRENEURIAL STRENGTH AND RELATIVE PROSPERITY FOR THE
    NEXT DECADE OF TWO.
(
        PREM HAS POLITICAL FAULTS AND IS BASICALLY WEAK.
    HIS TENURE IS UNCERTAIN. HE IS, HOWEVER, AN HONEST
    GENERAL AND PROMOTER OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE MILI-
€.
           HE IS NOW MAKING SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL CHAAGES
    IN THE THAI ARMY. THE THAI MILITARY HAS A LONG WAY
    TO GO. BUT. TO BE FAIR. IT HAS COME A LONG WAY TOC.
(
    IT CAN'T BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND AS A MILITARY FIRCE.
        THE COUNTRY HAS COPED SUCCESSFULLY WITH A POTEN-
    TIALLY CESTABILIZING REFUGEE FLOW AND THE PRESSURES
€.
    OF VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS NEXT DOOR. IT HAS IN THE
    PROCESS PROMOTED STRONG COLLECTIVE ASEAN ACTION AND
    ALIGNED ITSELF PROFITABLY TO BOTH THE PRC AND THE U.S.
C
        LOOKING AHEAD. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF UN-
    CERTAINTIES. PREM IS TEMPORARILY STRENGTHENED. BLT
    THAT IS ONLY BECAUSE EVERYONE ELSE IS TEMPORARILY
(
    WEAKENED OR CONFUSED -- IT WON'T LAST. THE ARMY AND
    PALACE HAVE LOST PRESTIGE AND WILL HAVE TO READJUST.
    BUT THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO FALL APART. PARLIAMENTARIANS.
STUDENTS, LABOR LEADERS, POLITICIANS, MILITARY OFFICERS,
    BANKERS AND OTHERS ARE RESTIVE AND WILL ALL BE PUSHING
    FOR CHANGES, OPERATING IN THE THAI WAY WHICH MEANS EACH
    FOR HIS OWN AND NOT MUCH COCPERATION OR FORESIGHT.
    NONE OF THIS IS NEW. THERE MAY BE ANOTHER COUP. 4
    CABINET SHUFFLE, AN ELECTION, OR NONE OF THE ABOVE.
    WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO ANTICIPATE OR IDENTIFY TREADS
    AS THEY DEVELOP. AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO DO SO. SINCE
    THE U.S. HAS MANY INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH CAN
Œ
    BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY CHANGES IN PERSONALITIES
    OR POLICIES. AMONG THE MORE VULNERABLE, NARROWLY-
    BASED RTG POLICIES ARE THOSE RELATED TO CHINA. REFUGEES.
VIETNAM AND OTHER SECURITY ISSUES, AND SOME ON THE
    ECONOMIC SIDE, ALL OF WHICH ARE OF INTEREST TO U.S.
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CONFIDENTIAL MSGNO 5 (STXX) *23/04/81* *01:00* NAS AS WE TRY TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN DETAIL, HOW-EVER. WE SHOULD ALL KEEP OUR PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE LIKELY CHANGES INVOLVED. FOR THE TIME BEING. THAILAND'S PRO-WEST. PRO-U.S. ORIENTALION IS NOT AT STAKE; ITS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS LIKELY TO BE REAS (NABLY STRONG; ITS POLITICAL TURMOIL IS LIKELY TO REMAIN WITHIN BOUNDS. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT GET TOO CLOSE TO ANY ONE PERSON OR POLICY AND AVOID BECOMING A POLITICAL ISSUE HERE, BUT WE CAN CERTAINLY REMAIN STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THAILAND ITSELF. WITHOUT OVER-REACTING TO UPS AND DOWNS THAT ARE CERTAIN TO RECLR. EXDIS OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS. MANY HAVE SEEN THAILAND IN DIRE TERMS. IN THE 50°S IT WAS THE THREAT FROM CLINA. IN THE 60°S THE INSURGENCY, IN THE 70°S THE CONSEGUENCES OF THE FALL OF VIETNAM. THROUGHOUT ALL THIS. THAILAND HAS COME THROUGH WITH A CUMULATIVE RECORD OF NOTELORTHY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS. THE ODDS ARE VERY GOOD IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO DESPITE SOME LIKELY SELF-INFLICTED ROUGH WEATHER AHEAD. ABRANOWITZ

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